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Loss-tolerant Bundle Fragment Authentication
for Space-based Networks
Xixiang Lv, Yi Mu, Senior Member, IEEE, and Hui Li
Abstract—Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), as the principal technology for space internet, implement and support internetworking via the Bundle Protocol (BP). Bundle authentication is a critical security service in DTNs which ensures the authenticity
and integrity of bundles during parallel multi-hop transmissions, especially when the bundle fragment service is needed.
The authentication based on digital signatures, suggested in the CCSDS bundle security protocol specification, inevitably
adds computational cost, transmission overhead and energy consumption. In this paper, we address the issue of fragment
authentication for BP by exploiting the well known erasure codes and the batch transmission characteristic of DTNs. In our
schemes, erasure codes are adopted to allow the receipts to recover the signature and the hashes of all the fragments of
a bundle no matter how many fragments they receive. In other words, only a part of authentication information are sufficient
to authenticate the received fragments from a bundle. Such an approach tolerates the high delay and unexpected loss of
connectivity of DTNs, and also the BP nature of routing fragments of the same bundle possibly via different paths. With this
main idea based on erasure codes, we present three approaches, all of which work well in resisting injection attacks and
eradicating traffic storms. The first one takes a surprisingly low communication cost due to fragment authentication, while it
makes all received fragments of a bundle to be removed when there is an injected one, because of its failure in locating the false
fragments. Considering this defect, we present an improved scheme which is able to detect injected fragments thanks to the
special geometrical structure of vector space and then only remove these injected ones. Aiming to further reduce communication
overheads, we constructed a specially linked hash chain based on which an injected fragment is quite easy to be filtered with
smaller authentication tags appended to fragments. The performance analysis verifies that our schemes, especially the third
one, significantly reduce bandwidth overheads and computational costs as compared to the prior works, and thus minimize the
energy consumption due to fragment authentication.
Index Terms—Delay Tolerant Networks, Authentication, Security
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I NTRODUCTION

Many of the popular applications on Internet today
are built on the assumption of immediate end-to-end
reachability. However, this assumption never holds
true for space internet, which are recognized as a type
of disruption/disconnect-tolerant networks (DTNs)
[1]. Due to this special nature of space internet, the
traditional security mechanisms are not always applicable, such as authentication for bundles. Traditional
authentication mechanisms, i.e., calculating a hash,
signing the hash and appending the signature to
the message, are not optimal when fragmentation
of bundles is needed. In this paper, we discuss the
efficient authentication mechanisms for fragments of
bundles in DTNs. In order to resistant injection attacks and eradicate traffic storms, we consider using
the well known erasure codes to construct efficient
• X. Lv is with the National key lab of ISN, Xidian University, Xi’an
710071, China
Email: xxlv@mail.xidian.edu.cn
• Y. Mu is with Centre for Computer and Information Security Research,
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of
Wollongong, NSW2522, Australia.
E-mail: ymu@uow.edu.au
• Hui Li is with National key lab of ISN, Xidian University, Xi’an
710071, China
Email: lihui@mail.xidian.edu.cn

authentication mechanisms for BP (Bundle Protocol)
fragments.
The DTN architecture which is described in RFC4838 [2] is a generalized store-and-forward network
overlay. It originates from NASA JPL’s experiences
in developing store-and-forward communication networks for deep space with high delay and frequent
disconnectivity. In DTNs, the in-transit PDUs (protocol data unit), also named bundles can be sent over
an existing link and buffered at the next hop until
the next link in the path appears. Networking using
this bundle-based store-and-forward techniques allows communication over multiple hops in a parallel
manner. Then, malicious routers can arbitrarily inject
false information into the bundles. If innocent routers
further propagate these injected messages, attackers
then are able to generate large amount of malicious
traffic in the network. We call this type of attacks
as injection attacks, which will lead to traffic storms
[3]. Since space DTNs depend on resource-constrained
mobile devices, traffic storms may result in a serious
threat on the network operation [4]. Therefore, to filter
injected messages as early as possible, a secure and
efficient bundle authentication mechanism should be
in place. Actually, bundles in space DTNs need to
be authenticated for several other reasons, such as
routing on intermediate nodes. Due to the limited
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resources, intermediate nodes may want to use authentication as the basis for policy-based routing and
forwarding. A typical scenario is that an intermediate
node only wants to store and forward messages from
a pre-defined set of known senders. In addition, the
recipient might also need to authenticate the originator for correctly interpreting the contents.
With respect to bundle authentication, the DTN
Research Group (DTNRG) has produced an Internet
draft describing a bundle security protocol specification [5]. The specification describes three IPsec [6]
style security headers that can be appended to bundles to provide three aspects of security services. The
Payload Integrity Header (PIH) is used to provide
end-to-end authentication in a similar fashion. The
Payload Confidentiality Header (PCH) is used to encapsulate encrypted payload. The Bundle Authentication Header (BAH) provides authentication for single
hop by adding a message authentication code (MAC)
or a signature to each bundle.
However, in space DTNs, fragmentation of bundles
is often needed. What this means is that an intermediate node can split a large bundle into smaller
fragments and route different fragments through different forwarding paths to make the best use of limited resources. With the CFDP/BP/LTP stack, there
are several of places where fragmentation and/or
aggregation can take place [1]. First, CFDP (CCSDS
File Delivery Protocol) and its UT-layer (Unitdata
Transfer layer) interface to BP dictates the sizes of the
bundles exchanged between CFDP entities. While BP
may fragment bundles for transmission through the
network, it must reassemble them completely at the
destination before delivering them to the application.
In addition, in order to recover from unexpected loss
of link connectivity, some BP stack implementations
may consider reactive fragmentation; that is, if the
transmitting BP router knows how much data from
a particular bundle transmission has been successfully received when the connectivity is broken off, it
could choose to reactively fragment the bundle. This
assumes that the receiver forms a bundle fragment
from the data already received, and the sender forms
another fragment from the last known byte received.
The fragment at the source is then re-routed, possibly
via another path if one is available.
Thus, when bundle fragmentation is supported,
CCSDS Bundle Security Protocol Specification [5] does
not work well, in that the additional signature to
each fragment of a bundle will involve a series of
performance obstacles: high transmission overheads,
computational costs and energy consumption. Obviously, the large size of digital signature will introduce
increasing extra transmission overhead, and verifying
those individual signatures one by one at each intermediate DTN router and the receiver will significantly
increase the computational costs of bundle authentication. Another unapparent performance obstacle is
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energy consumption. In fact, the high transmission
and computational overhead also translates to high
energy consumption. This energy consumption issue
becomes more challenging when multi-copy or even
flooding based propagation method is employed in
order to enhance the reliability of space DTN transmission [7], [8], since the signature transmission and
verification are performed along each fragment delivery path.
This paper discusses methods to authenticate fragments of bundles of space DTNs efficiently in computation and inexpensively in communication. Specifically, our approach tolerates loss of fragments, i.e.,
loss of some fragments does not affect the authenticity
and integrity verification for the remainder fragments;
and intermediate routers are able to verify the received fragments even if other fragments of the same
bundle are routed to other paths.
Our contributions. This paper investigates a close
variation of the above mentioned problem of BP fragment authentication and focuses on ”how to authenticate fragments for BP of space internet efficiently
in computation and communication”. We provide a
brief overview of some new ideas to solve this problem. Then, we aim to minimize the costs of computation/communication and to tolerate the nature
of multi-hop parallel forwarding of BP as well. We
use a combination of hash and signature techniques
with FEC, or more precisely, erasure codes. Erasure
Codes are utilized to adapt to high delay, unexpected
loss of connectivity, and to allow the transmission
overhead from the only one signature to be equally
shared by all fragments, each of which carries a
lower overhead. In this way, the signature and the
hashes of all the fragments of a bundle are encoded
to generate n codewords appended to n fragments,
where only np of them are sufficient to authenticate
all the fragments in the bundle (p < 1). Since the
intermediate router or the receiver can recover the
authentication information from at least np codewords
carried by the received fragments, such an approach
allows up to (1 − p)n not received fragments due to
high delay and unexpected loss of connectivity, and
also tolerates the BP nature of routing fragments of
the same bundle possibly via different paths. Actually,
here erasure codes are used to operate on packet-sized
data objects.
On the above-mentioned basis, we propose three
candidate approaches, all of which are effective in resisting injection attacks and eradicating traffic storms.
The first one adds a surprisingly low extra overhead
to BP, while it makes all received fragments of a bundle to be removed when there is an injected fragment,
because of its failure in locating the false fragments.
In the second approach, considering this defect, we
suggest utilizing the special geometrical construction
of vector space to detect maliciously injected frag-
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ments and then only remove these injected ones.
Aiming to further reduce communication overheads
and computation costs, we constructed a specially
linked hash chain based on which injected fragments
are quite easy to be filtered with smaller additional
authentication tags to fragments. Our performance
evaluations justified the merits of our schemes.
Paper organization. The remaining sections are arranged as follows. In Section 2, we revisit DTNs
security issues and fragment authentication for BP.
In Section 3, we describe the models and our design
goals. In Section 4, we will present our first erasure
codes based scheme, which is improved in Section
5 by using geometrical construction of vector space
to locate injected fragments. In Section 6, we further
reduce the communication overhead by utilizing a
novel hash chain to filter injected fragments. Section
7 concludes the paper.

2

R ELATED W ORKS

DTN Security and Bundle Authentication. A DTN,
accepted as the space internetworking approach, can
bridge between dissimilar lower-layer networks and
can operate simultaneously over heterogeneous networks (i.e., CCSDS, IPv4, IPv6 and Bluetooth) or even
directly over a datalink protocol. It operates over
convergence layers which are underlying protocols
that accomplish communication between DTN entities
using the Bundle Protocol. Security issue is one of
the major challenges for DTN deployment. Farrell
and Cahill review the current state of DTN security
works in [4]. They point out that the main threats for
DTNs are modification of messages (or ”bundles”),
unauthorized use of scarce DTN resources and denial
of service. Due to resource-scarcity characteristic of
DTNs, a general motivation for DTN security is to
prevent the attackers from unauthorized accessing
and utilizing of DTN resources. To this end, the DTN
Bundle Security Specification [5] defines BAH, PIH,
and PCH to provide security services on the network
layer. An additional draft [9] explaining the rationale
for the design choices made in this specification. Even
though public key signature based bundle authentication solutions adopted in current Bundle Security
Protocol Specification has provided a general framework to secure space DTNs and it also holds the great
advantage of providing interoperability, there are still
two open issues: fragment authentication issue and
performance issue.
Due to fragmentation, traditional authentication
scheme [5], e.g., the sender generates the signature
over an entire message, may not work well since
the intermediate receiver cannot authenticate any of
the received fragments if it has not yet received the
entire message. To address this problem, a trivial
approach was proposed in [10] and has come up at the
DTNRG mailing list discussions. The main idea is to
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make each fragment self-authenticating by attaching
a signature to each fragment separately, i.e., each
fragment carries its own signature to make it selfauthenticating. However, this approach may lead to a
more serious performance issue since the intermediate
nodes have to take more computational and transmission efforts for transmitting and verifying a growing
number of signatures. Because of the resource-scarcity
characteristic of space networks, how to minimize the
security cost and improve the bundle authentication
efficiency becomes a critical problem. Efficiency issue
is extremely important in space DTNs because the
multi-copy routing/forwarding is very common and
the fragmentation issue also makes this problem more
challenging.
Aiming to achieve advantages in efficiency over
the trivial scheme in [10], Partridge presents a few
solution proposals for this fragment authentication
problem in [11]. The first proposal is to use cumulative
authentication in which each fragment is authenticated by calculating a hash over all the previous
fragments including the current fragment. The computation costs for the receiver is less than the trivial
approach in [10], since only one signature per a set
of received fragments has to be verified. However,
this approach does not reduce computational costs of
sender or the amount of traffic, since a signature has to
be generated and added to each fragment. In addition,
this approach assumes that fragments are received in
order which might not be the case always. The second
proposal in [11] is to authenticate fragments using
function definitions. Rather than protecting the data
with a hash value from an authentication function,
this proposal suggests to protect the data with a
dynamically generated function that gives a known
result. N. Asokan [3] presents a binary hash tree (or
Merkle Tree) based fragment authentication approach
in which each fragment has to carry log2 n hash values
for verifying itself. Accordingly, it is very expensive
when n is large. The latest contribution by Zhu et
al. [12] presents an opportunistic batch authentication
scheme to achieve efficient bundle authentication, in
which the well known Merkle Tree is used to minimize communication overhead and a batch verifiable
signature is used to minimize the computation costs
of the receiver.
Since the above described two issues are closely
related, we aim to address the two issues together.
The objective of this paper is to minimize the computational and transmission overhead due to fragment
authentication by exploiting erasure coding and the
bundle buffering characteristics.
Erasure Coding. Now we give a brief introduction
to the principle of erasure codes, especially clarifying their special operation manner here. For a more
in-depth discussion on erasure codes the interested
reader is referred to the literatures [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17].
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An erasure encoding algorithm Ck,r takes a set
X = x1 , x2 , · · · , xk of k source packets in a block
as input and produces n = (k + r) encoded packets:
{y1 , · · · , yk+r } ← Ck,r (X). The main property of the
set Y = {y1 , · · · , yk+r } is that any subset of k elements
of Y is sufficient to recover the source data X via the
corresponding decoding algorithm Dk .
Rizzo [17] presents an erasure code which is flexible
and efficient to implement, and discusses various issues related to its performance. Reed-Solomon erasure
codes given in [17] operate in GF (2n ) and may be
inefficient for large data packets with several hundred
kilobytes for each. However, they are appropriate
for our scenario because we operate on hash values
(typically 16 or 20 bytes) that are much smaller than
packets. Rizzo also suggested to use erasure codes in
multicast and broadcast applications, which is instantiated in [18]. For faster codes, the interested readers
are suggested to refer to [19], [20] describing Tornado
Codes with near linear coding and decoding times. In
this paper, we suggest to consider the so-called linear
block codes since they are simple and appropriate for
the application scenario of our interest.
It is important to note that erasure codes are used
here in a completely new manner. On one hand,
here they are not used in the traditional context as
telephony, in that an individual tag can intuitively
be viewed more like a single code symbol rather
than a set of symbols. On the other hand, the coding operation is also different from that of reliable
transmission mechanisms based on erasure codes in
deep space networks [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26],
since we use coding on small authentication tags
rather than packets themselves. We use erasure codes
not to recover damaged packets but rather the lost
authentication tags of fragments of a bundle.

3

M ODELS

AND

D ESIGN G OALS

In this section, we describe the system and adversary
models, followed by our design goals.
System Model. We consider space DTNs which can
bridge between dissimilar lower-layer subnetworks
and operate simultaneously over heterogeneous subnetworks using the Bundle Protocol suits. In such
a space internet, a source node can deliver bundles
to a destination node via one or multiple paths depending on any particular forwarding algorithm [8].
Specifically, for an intermediate node, it may contemporarily receive bundles from multiple senders via
one or multiple hops. These received bundles will
be manipulated based on two special technologies:
store-and-forward and custody transfer [1]. Store-andforward means storing data before it is forwarded.
Unlike the Internet model of store-and-forward where
data is stored long enough to look up a next hop and
queue the data on an outbound link, the consideration
here is to store PDUs for arbitrary lengths of time,
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if no outbound path is currently available. Custody
transfer is a network service that provides reliability
on a hop-by-hop basis rather than an end-to-end basis.
With custody transfer, the DTN node is responsible
for retransmitting data if that data is lost in progress
towards the data destination.
Further, a bundle may be split inside the network
and reassembled later before being delivered to its
destination [1]. What this means is that the source
or an intermediate node can split a large bundle
into smaller fragments and route different fragments
possibly through different forwarding paths, to adapt
to high delay/disruption space links and make the
best use of limited resources. We think that BP cannot
aggregate multiple bundles together into larger data
units for transmission. This paper follows a general
assumption such as [27] that there exits an Offline
Security Manager (OSM) to take charge of issuing
certificate for traditional public key cryptosystem or
generating private key for identity based cryptosystem.
Adversary Model. Consider that the adversary’s goal
is to inject false messages into the network, attempting
to deceive other DTN nodes, gain unauthorized access
to DTN resources, or exhaust constrained network
resources, especially energy resources. Here, we call
this type of attacks as injection attack which is a
variant of bogus message flooding attack in which a
malicious DTN node might arbitrarily inject forged
bundles or fragments. However, we consider neither
adversaries being able to compromise DTN nodes, nor
adversaries aiming at signature algorithm itself. This
adversary model is defined in [12].
Design Goals. Our security design goal is straightforward, i.e., resisting injection attacks and eradicating traffic storms with low costs in communication
and computation. To be specific, when fragmentation
service is needed and only one single signature for a
bundle is shared by all of its fragments, all received
or relayed fragments should be authenticated even if
some other fragments of the same bundle are lost
or routed via other paths, so that the false ones
inserted by any illegitimate DTN users or external
attackers can be efficiently rejected or filtered as early
as possible. Meanwhile we concentrate on minimizing
the overheads due to authentication for bundle fragments. Especially, computational cost, communication
overhead as well as energy consumption are given
priority to cope with the resource constrained nature
of space DTNs. In addition, we want to detect the false
fragments (bing modified or injected) by utilizing the
geometrical construction of vector space or a specially
linked hash chain, and therefore only remove these
false fragments.

4

T HE BASIC S CHEME

In this section, we propose a bundle fragment authentication scheme which aims to minimize the computa-
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tional overhead by exploiting only one signature and
one verification for all fragments of the same bundle.
Then, we take advantage of erasure coding technique
to tolerate unexpected loss of fragments and the DTN
nature of routing fragments of the same bundle via
different paths.
In this work, we will consider a bundle to be
split into n consecutive fragments. For simplicity, we
assume that a bundle exactly contains a number of
fragments which is an exact multiple of n. Our fragment authentication scheme is parameterized by n the
bundle size in fragments and p the average probability
that all fragments of the same bundle are routed to the
same intermediate router (or node). For simplicity, we
further assume that the average probability p covers
fragment loss due to unexpected loss of connectivity
or others.
We denote H as a cryptographic hash function such
as SHA or MD5. The couple (S, V ) denotes the digital
signature and verification algorithms with the public
key Kp and private key Ks respectively. The size of
the signatures will be expressed as s bytes. For RSA,
a typical value for s is 128 bytes (or 1024 bits).
4.1

Algorithms

The objective of the following Algorithm 1 is to
generate a set of security tags from the signature
of a bundle and respectively append each of them
to a fragment of this bundle, so that the receiver
and intermediate routers can verify and distinguish
the authentic fragments conditioned on correctly receiving at least np authentic fragments. In principle,
the security tag is extra information that represent
communication overhead being used to resist injection
attacks.
Generation of Authentication Tags. We denote the
fragments of a bundle as f1 , f2 , · · · , fn , each of which
will piggyback an authentication tag before transmission. The authentication tags are extracted as follows:
Algorithm 1.
1) Let X = {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn |hi ← H(fi ), i = 1, 2,
· · · , n};
2) {X; X 0 } ← Cn,r (X);
3) σ ← S(Ks , H(h1 kh2 k · · · khn ));
4) Split (σkX 0 ) into dpne blocks B = {B1 , B2 , · · · ,
Bdpne } with the same size;
5) {B; B 0 } ← Cdpne,d(1−p)ne (B);
6) Append each of the codewords of {B; B 0 }, represented by T = {τ1 , τ2 , · · · , τn }, to one fragment
respectively.
Here, we denote by S a digital signature algorithm
and by σ the resulting signature signed with private
key Ks . In this algorithm, we let Cn,r be an erasure encoding algorithm with r extra redundancy codewords
and total (n + r) codewords. The number of extra
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redundancy codewords r satisfies two requirements:
(1) r is larger than or equal to d(1 − p)en for successfully decoding in Step 3 of the following Algorithm
2; and (2) enough redundancy codewords make space
networks be able to withstand the average probability
of p that all fragments of the same bundle are routed
to the same intermediate router. Then, r is determined
by this average probability p and a concrete coding
algorithm. For example, if we use the erasure code
based on Vandermonde matrices [17], the minimum
e. We also use the erasure code
value of r is d (1−p)n
p
based on Vandermonde matrices for Cdpne,d(1−p)ne (B),
aiming to get exactly n codewords of {B; B 0 }. Thus
we must split (σkX 0 ) into dpne blocks with same sizes
and each block Bi is an original word to be coded.
Decoding and Verification. Consider the set R = {Ri }
of the received fragments, where Ri = {fi0 kτi } and
|R| ≥ (pn). Here, i is fi0 ’s position, or index in the
original encoding operation. we assume that T = {τi }
includes |R| tags from R. The verifier will use these
authentication tags to recover the signature for all
the fragments and other authentication information
to verify the signature. The decoding and verification
is as follows:
Algorithm 2.
1) {σkX 0 } ← D(T );
2) For each fragment in R, compute h0i = H(fi0 ) and
let E = {h0i };
3) {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn } ← D(EkX 0 );
4) V (σ, {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn }) to authenticate the received fragments.
Here, D(·) denotes the decoding algorithm. This decoding and verification process tells us that any subset
of {f1 , f2 , · · · , fn } can be authenticated if its size is
larger than or equal to dpne. What this means is that if
the average probability p is accurately estimated, the
only one signature equally shared by all fragments
can authenticate all the fragments of a bundle. Thus,
we can effectively reduce the transmission cost as well
as computational cost and thus minimize the energy
consumption due to bundle fragment authentication.
It is important to note that the decoding algorithm
needs to know the position, or index, of the received
fragments and this information can be derived from
the sequence numbers of the fragments in the PDUs.
4.2

Parameters and Performance Evaluation

Using Learning to Approximate p. In order to utilize
erasure cods, we need the global information such as
the probability p. This can be achieved by a history
learning process [28]. For example, each node records
the number of total received fragments of the same
bundle during a specific past time duration. It also
periodically updates and broadcasts its probability
information. The node computes the overall approximation of p based on its local record and the received
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neighboring information. Thus, all nodes will have the
global and accurate view about the network history.
This history can be limited to some time duration if
the network size is large.
The objective of the above scheme is to minimize
the cost of bundle authentication when fragmentation
service is needed in DTNs. Thus, the greater n, the
less often we will need to generate a signature and
to transmit the authentication tag. Meanwhile, the
lower probability p will result in more redundancy
codewords. Theoretically, the erasure coding can withstand arbitrarily small p. In other words, enough
extra redundancy will always make all fragments of
a bundle to be authenticated. However we need to
relate the parameters n and p to concrete average
network patterns in space. That is, the sender needs to
adjust the parameter n such that most bundles would
be verifiable.
Size of an Authentication Tag. Let h define the length
of the cryptographic hashes and s the size of the
signatures. The size of an individual authentication
tag is expressed as λ(n, p) of both the number of
fragments of a bundle and the average probability
that all fragments of the same bundle are routed to the
same intermediate router (or node). From Algorithm
1, we have
(1 − p)n
rh + s
, where r = d
e.
λ(n, p) =
dpne
p
This λ(n, p) presents the communication overhead
of our bundle fragment authentication scheme, and
remains surprisingly small if either n is large or p is
reasonably high.
The simulations presented in [12] show that, in
a high traffic load case, there exist up to 98.25%
DTN contacts during which DTN transmission is
performed in a batch (two or more bundles are transferred simultaneously). This result also applies to the
fragments of the same bundle, i.e., most fragments
of the same bundle are transferred simultaneously in
DTN. What this means is that the average probability
p with which all fragments of the same bundle are
routed to the same intermediate router (or node) is
sufficiently high. Thus, our scheme will place a very
low communication overhead to BP for fragment authentication. With s = 128 bytes and h = 16 bytes, we
present a sampling of λ(n, p) for different p and n in
Table 1. Note that we let the value of λ to be the lowest
multiple of dpne greater than or equal to (rh + s).
Computation Costs. The main computation cost for a
TABLE 1: Overhead bytes per fragment.
HH n
16
p HH
0.9825
0.75
0.6

9
19
31

32

64

128

256

512

1024

5
13
24

3
10
21

2
9
20

1
8
19

1
8
19

1
8
18

sender comes from cryptographic hash computations,
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a digital signature and two coding operations. For
each bundle, the source needs to generate n hash
values, a digital signature, and encode twice. Here,
note that the erasure codes may be computationally
expensive for large data packets but this operation
on our small authentication tags will be relatively
efficient.
The computation cost for the recipient depends on
the average probability p of the space DTNs. It only
needs to compute n hashes and verifies a signature in
an ideal situation, i.e., it does not need decoding since
it gets all fragments. If the recipient does not receive
all the fragments of a bundle, it will need to calculate
some additional decoding. The decoding is utilized
to recover the hashes of the missed fragments, rather
then the fragments themselves. Thus, the decoding is
not expensive since the tags are much smaller than
general packets.
Discussion about Pollution Attacks. The above
scheme is able to eradicate traffic storms in that any
injected false information into bundles will be filtered
as early as possible by signature verification at the
intermediate routers. Actually, it makes all received
fragments of a bundle to be removed even if there is
a single modified fragment or a malicious fragment
injected by an adversary, because it can not locate
the false fragments. This may be an issue in a sense
and can be addressed by each fragment carrying more
extra authentication information. However, it shows
a trade-off between the performance and communication/computation costs, especially for resourcescarcity space networks. To locate the modified or
injected fragments and to exactly recover the authentication information, a sender must augment each
fragment with enough redundancy information. What
follows is an improved scheme with this idea.
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S CHEME

WITH

D ETECTING FALSE F RAG -

MENTS

In order to detect false fragments, the source generates
another tag and appends it to the corresponding
fragment. This tag enables the verifier to identify
the authentic fragments and just remove the injected
or modified fragments. Here, fi , i = 1, 2, · · · , n still
represent n fragments of a bundle to be sent. This
type of authentication tags are extracted as follows:
Algorithm 3.
1) Let X = {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn |hi ← H(fi ), i = 1, 2,
· · · , n};
2) {X; X 0 } ← Cn,r (X);
3) σ ← S(Ks , H(h1 kh2 k, · · · , khn ));
4) Split (σkX 0 ) into dpne blocks B = {B1 , B2 , · · · ,
Bdpne } with the same size;
5) {B; B 0 } ← Cdpne,d(1−p)ne (B);
6) Each of the codewords of {B; B 0 } is used as an
tag and let T = {τ1 , τ2 , · · · , τn };
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7) Map the hashes h1 , h2 , · · · , hn of the fragments
−
→ −
→
−
→
into vectors h1 , h2 , · · · , hn in an n dimensional
vector space V = Fqn ;
−
→ −
→
−
→
−
8) Derive →
ui , i = 1, 2, · · · , n from h1 , h2 , · · · , hn ;
−
9) Append the authentication tag (τi k→
ui ) to the
fragment fi , i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Here, note that every set of (n − 1) linearly independent vectors in vector space V spans a unique
hyperplane (or an (n − 1) dimensional sub-space)
→
−
P ⊂ V. Then, for each hi we can derive a vector
→
−
ui which is orthogonal with the hyperplane Pi ⊂ V
spanned by the other (n − 1) linearly independent
→
−
−
vectors hj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n and j 6= i. Obviously, →
ui
uniquely represents the hyperplane Pi .
The coding algorithms and parameter r are similar
to that of Algorithm 1.
We assume that the set R = {Ri } includes the
−
received fragments, in which Ri = {fi0 kτi k→
ui }, |R| ≥
0
(pn), and i is fi ’s position in the original encoding
operation. Let the set T 0 = {τi } include |R| tags from
R. The verifier will use T 0 to recover the signature for
−
all the fragments. The vector →
ui is used to find and
remove a modified fragment or a maliciously injected
fragment. The decoding and verification is as follows:
Algorithm 4.
1) For each fragment in R, compute h0i = H(fi0 ) and
E = {h0i };
2) Map each hash value in E into the n dimensional
→
−
vector space V = Fqn and get another set { h0i };
→
−
→
−
3) For each vector in { h0i }, if h0i belongs to at least
(dpne − 1) hyperplanes represented by the tags
−
among {→
uj , j 6= i}, fi0 is authentic; otherwise,
remove h0i from E and fi0 from the received
fragment set R;
4) If the size of E is not smaller than dpne, decode
as {σkX 0 } ← D(T 0 ) and {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn } ←
D(EkX 0 );
5) V (σ, {h1 , h2 , · · · , hn }) to authenticate the received fragments.
Making the decision on whether fi0 is an authentic
→
−
fragment or not is based on the fact that if h0i is an
authentic tag, then it belongs to at least (dpne−1) other
authentic hyperplanes Pj represented by (dpne − 1)
−
authentic {→
uj }. This filter is also based on the assumption that there are at least dpne authentic frag−
ments and dpne authentic vectors →
u in the received
fragments. If not so, it is impossible to recover the
authentication tags and thus to verify the signature,
even though all the fragments and tags are authentic.
What this means is that dpne is the threshold making our scheme work well. Note that the screening
condition of Step 3 in Algorithm 4 is strict enough in
that if fi is authentic there is at least one hyperplanes
Pj represented by the tag uj , j 6= i satisfying the
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→
−
−
requirement of h0i ⊂ Pj , unless all the tags →
ui are
modified.
Obviously, the probability of the hash vector h0i of
a modified or random injected fragment belongs to
the hyperplane represented by the tag uj , j 6= i of an
authentic fragment is 1/q. Thus, it can be observed
that an injected or modified fragment passes the
authenticity filtering with the probability of at most
( 1q )dpne , where q is the field size.
The communication overhead of this improved
scheme is
rh + s
−
λ0 (n, p) = λ(n, p) + |→
+ n log2 (q),
u|=
dpne
where
r=d

(1 − p)n
e.
p

In Table 2, we present a sampling of the communication overhead with q = 4. From Table 2, we get
TABLE 2: Overhead bytes per fragment.
H n
p H
H
0.9825
0.75
0.6

H

16

32

64

128

256

512

1024

13
23
35

13
21
32

19
26
37

34
41
52

65
72
83

129
136
147

257
264
274

−
a conclusion that the extra tag →
u greatly increases
the communication overhead of authentication for
bundles, especially at a larger number of fragments.
Thus, this scheme is desirable when the number of
fragments is relatively small. With q = 4, this scheme
is not applicable for space DTN when the number of
fragments is larger than 256. In this case, it makes no
sense and is even worse than the scheme proposed in
[10]. Considering this efficiency issue, we give another
improved scheme in the following section, in which
we utilize a special hash chain to filter injected fragments and adopt erasure coding to tolerate fragment
loss and the nature of multi-hop parallel forwarding
of BP as well. With this scheme, the false fragments
inserted by any illegitimate DTN users or external
attackers can be efficiently rejected in an early stage,
thus injection attacks can be eradicated effectively.

6 S CHEME
C HAIN

BASED

ON

S PECIAL H ASH

In this section, we propose a bundle fragment authentication scheme which aims to effectively filter
injected or false fragments and minimize the communication overhead. We first present a special hash
chain which is used to verify fragments originated
from the same bundle and resist injection attacks.
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6.1

Construction of Special Hash Chain

The objective is to generate a set of verification tags
and append each of them to a fragment such that
the recipient can verify and distinguish the fragments
from the same bundle. We denote the payload of
a bundle as M , and let the fragments of M to be
f1 , f2 , · · · , fn each of which will piggyback an verification tag derived from a special hash chain before
transmission. The hash chain called L is constructed
as Figure 1.
As illustrated in Figure 1, each fragment fi piggybacks a tag derived from the hash valve of its preceding fragment fi−1 , i.e., fi k hi and hi = H(fi khi−1 )
initialized at h1,1 = H(f1 ) and h2 = H(f2 kh1,1 ).
Here H(·) is a collision-resistant hash function. The
final fragment carries a hash of the entire message.
Note that h1,2 = H(f1 khn ) makes the hash chain to
be an inseparable whole. This chain will lead to an
unbreakable cyclic dependency among the fragments
of a same bundle. Hash-linking each fragment to its
successive fragment makes it difficult for attackers to
excessively increase the complexity of filtering false
fragments and reassembling the bundle at receivers
by inserting or modifying fragments. This specially
linked hash chain effectively prevents an adversary to
insert malicious fragments without violating the hash
verification. We assume that fi∗ is an injected fragment
which takes the position, or index, of fi . Then, fi∗ must
satisfy the requirement of hi = H(fi∗ khi−1 ), h(i − 1) =
H(fi−1 khi−2 ) and extending to the whole chain as
such. Obviously, injection attacks will be found easily
unless the adversary replaces all fragments of the
target bundle.
Alice
Input M

Compute: h = H(M)

Bob
M
Receive

M'

Receive

h

h

And accept if

h  H ( M ')

Reject otherwise

Fig. 1: Hash Chain Against Injection Attacks.

6.2 Fragment Authentication based on Hash
Chain
Although the above-mentioned hash chain is effective in verifying fragments originated from the same
source and resisting injection attacks, it is built on the
assumption that all fragments are received. However,
this assumption never holds true for space DTNs,
because fragments are often lost and fragments of the
same bundle are possibly routed via different paths.
Both make the verification at intermediate routers and
the receiver to fail. For example, fi cannot be verified
if its successive fragment is lost. Aiming to address
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this issue, we utilize erasure codes to recover the
missed hashes on the chain L so that all received
or relayed fragments should be verified even if some
other fragments of the same bundle are lost or routed
via other paths. Thereby the false ones inserted by any
attackers can be efficiently filtered as early as possible.
In addition, the signature is utilized to authenticate
their common origin or source.
In the following algorithm, the couple (S, V ) still
denotes the digital signature and verification algorithms with the public key Kp and secret key Ks
respectively.
Algorithm 5.
1) σ ← S(Ks , hn ), i.e., sign on the hash hn including the information of the entire bundle;
2) Split {σkH 0 } into dpne blocks B
=
{B1 , B2 , · · · , Bdpne } with same sizes, where
H 0 = {h1,1 , h2 , h3 , · · · , hn , h1,2 };
3) {B; B} ←− Cdpne,d(1−p)ne (B);
4) Append each of the codewords of {B; B}, represented by T = {τ1 , τ2 , · · · , τn }, to one fragment
respectively.
In this algorithm, the encoding algorithm
Cdpne,d(1−p)ne is same as Algorithms 1. The decoding
and verification are presented in Algorithm 6.
It is important to note that the hash chain L itself is effective in verifying fragments of the same
bundle and resisting injection attacks. Accordingly, if
a scenario does not need origin authentication, the
generation of signature will be omitted. Thus, only
(n + 1) hash values are encoded in Algorithm 5.
In this case, injected fragments will be found easily
unless the adversary replaces all fragments of the
target bundle. However, hash-linking each fragment
to its successive fragment increases the complexity
of attackers replacing all fragments and reassembling
them into a chain, since the fragments of a bundle
are forwarded in a multi-hop parallel manner and via
different paths.
Algorithm 6.
1) B ← D(T 0 );
2) Derive σ and H 0 from B, here H 0 =
{h1,1 , h2 , h3 , · · · , hn , h1,2 };
3) For each fragment fi0 in the set R, if
H(fi0 khi−1 ) 6= hi , remove this fragment fi0 . Here
hi ∈ H 0 including the hash values on the recovered chain;
4) Verify V (σ, hn ) to authenticate the source, here
hn is the last hash on the chain.
Here, D(·) denotes the decoding algorithm and T 0
is the set including all tags carried by the received
fragments. The set R = {R1 , R2 , · · · , Rn } contains the
received fragments, in which Ri = {fi0 kτi } (The index
i is fi0 ’s position in the original fragment chain.), or
Ri = ⊥ taking the position of the lost fragments on
the original chain.
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6.3

Performance Evaluation

Size of an authentication tag. Let h represent the
length of a hash value and s the size of the signatures. The size of an individual authentication tag is
expressed as λ00 (n, p) of both the number of bundle
fragments and the average probability that all fragments of the same bundle are routed to the same
intermediate router. According to Algorithm 5, we
have
s + (n + 1)h
λ00 (n, p) =
dpne
which is much smaller than that of the scheme in
Section 6, especially when n is large. This λ00 (n, p)
presents the communication overhead and remains
very small if either n is large or p is reasonably high.
To evaluate the communication overhead, we still
refer to the simulation result of [12], which tells us that
most fragments of the same bundle are transferred simultaneously in DTN, i.e., the average probability p is
enough high in general. With s = 128 bytes and h = 16
bytes, we present a sampling of λ00 (n, p) for different
p and n in Table 3. Note that we let the value of λ00
in the following table to be the lowest integer greater
or equal to λ00 (n, p). It is quite obvious form Table
TABLE 3: Overhead bytes per fragment in Algorithm 5.
H n
H
16 32 64
128 256 512
1024
p HH
0.9825
0.75
0.6

25
34
42

21
28
33

19
25
30

18
23
29

17
22
28

17
22
27

17
22
27

3 that the injection-resistant fragment authentication
scheme based on hash chain L places a very low
communication overhead to Bundle Protocol of DTNs.
This approach dramatically reduces the bandwidth
overhead as compared to the prior scheme based
on vector space, especially when n the number of
fragments is large. In addition, its computation costs
are very low as well since it encodes and decodes only
once respectively, which we present later.
Computation costs. For the above scheme based on
hash chain L, the main computation cost of a sender
comes from generating (n+1) hash values, one digital
signature, and one time encoding. Here, the erasure
coding operates on small authentication tags and thus
is relatively efficient.
The computation cost of the recipient depends on
the probability p. In an ideal situation, i.e., p = 1, the
recipient just computes (n + 1) hashes and verifies
a signature, since it does not need to decoding. If
the recipient does not receive all the fragments of a
bundle, it needs some additional decoding operations.
Discussion about pollution attacks. This scheme is
able to eradicate traffic storms in that any injected
false fragments will be filtered out. It is important to
note that our schemes can effectively find the injected
fragments and thereafter remove only the injected
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fragments rather than all the received fragments as
[12], or the entire bundle as [5].

7

C ONCLUSION

In this paper, by exploiting the well known erasure
coding and the batch transmission characteristic of
DTNs, we have given three candidate approaches
for bundle authentication when bundle fragmentation
service is needed in space internet. All of them are
effective in resisting injection attacks and eradicating
traffic storms. The first one places a surprisingly low
communication overhead to a bundle, while it makes
all received fragments of a bundle to be removed even
if there is just one false or injected fragment. This
is due to its failure in locating the false fragments.
Considering this issue, we presented the second one
which utilizes special geometrical construction of vector space to detect injected fragments and then only
remove these injected ones. Aiming to further reduce
communication overheads, we constructed a specially
linked hash chain based on which injected fragments
are quite easy to be filtered out only with a very small
authentication tag appended to a fragment. The performance analysis verifies that our schemes, especially
the third one, can effectively reduce the transmission
cost as well as computational cost, and thus minimize
the energy consumption due to fragment authentication. This advantage more highlights when the traffic
load is reasonably high. The proposed schemes can
be directly applied to space internetworking scenarios
for solutions of bundle authentication when fragmentation service is needed.
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